Merger of Princely States
Pre partitioned IndiaMerger of Princely States
Pre partitioned India comprised territories administered by different colonial powers like British, France and Portugal & some were hereditary rulers. The political integration of these territories into India was very important to India. Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel convinced the rulers of the various princely states to accede to India. Having secured their accession, they then proceeded to, in a step-by-step process, secure and extend the central government’s authority over these states and transform their administrations until, by 1956, there was little difference between the territories that had formerly been part of British India and those that had been part of princely states. Although this process successfully integrated the vast majority of princely states into India, it was not as successful in relation to a few states, notably the former princely states of Kashmir, Tripura and Manipur, where active secessionist movements existed.
Don’t we think that if Nehru had given free hand to Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, would have been AKHAND BHARAT today, that NONE ELSE could safeguard.
But those, who had covered themselves in eternal shame are glorified sky high, telling us that Gandhi still rules supreme while Bharat, had been seeinh “begging before her Islam” since last seven decades, and was unable to remove Article 370, or build a Temple in Ayodhya, or take the frontier back from Wagah to Khyber, leave aside “sorting out” Kashmir by altering demography, or “taming” the muslim minority, which remained in India inspite of unethical partition based on religion.
Nehru demanded and got J&K for his exclusive management. Fortunately there was a time, when Sardar Patel got opportunity to freely act in integrating Hyderabad into India.
Nehru had gone to London to attend some Common Wealth Gatherings, a useless outfit, while Gandhi was busy experimenting with his so-called truth, consequent to granting of partition of India through the bloodiest route of human history & passed away in January 1948, giving free hand to Patel comprised territories administered by different colonial powers like British, France and Portugal & some were hereditary rulers. The political integration of these territories into India was very important to India. Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel convinced the rulers of the various princely states to accede to India. Having secured their accession, they then proceeded to, in a step-by-step process, secure and extend the central government’s authority over these states and transform their administrations until, by 1956, there was little difference between the territories that had formerly been part of British India and those that had been part of princely states. Although this process successfully integrated the vast majority of princely states into India, it was not as successful in relation to a few states, notably the former princely states of Kashmir, Tripura and Manipur, where active secessionist movements existed.
Don’t we think that if Nehru had given free hand to Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, would have been AKHAND BHARAT today, that NONE ELSE could safeguard.
But those, who had covered themselves in eternal shame are glorified sky high, telling us that Gandhi still rules supreme while Bharat, had been seeing “begging before her Islam” since last seven decades, and was unable to remove Article 370, or build a Temple in Ayodhya, or take the frontier back from Wagah to Khyber, leave aside “sorting out” Kashmir by altering demography, or “taming” the muslim minority, which remained in India inspite of unethical partition based on religion.
Nehru demanded and got J&K for his exclusive management. Fortunately there was a time, when Sardar Patel got opportunity to freely act in integrating Hyderabad into India.
Nehru had gone to London to attend some Common Wealth Gatherings, a useless outfit, while Gandhi was busy experimenting with his so-called truth, consequent to granting of partition of India through the bloodiest route of human history & passed away in January 1948, giving free hand to Patel
Reasons for integration
Saurashtra and kathiawar regions of Gujrat home to over two hundred princely states, many with non-contiguous territories.
Early British plans for the transfer of power, such as the offer produced by Cripps Mission, recognised the possibility that some princely states may choose to stand out of independent India. This was unacceptable to the political leadership of India however most of congress leaders like Mohan Dass Gandhi and Jawahar Lal Nehru were sympathetic to to the princes.
Rise of socialist Congress leaders such as Jaya Prakash Narayan began to actively engage with popular political and labour activity in the princely states. By 1939, the Congress’ official stance was that the states must enter independent India, on the same terms and with the same autonomy as the provinces of British India, and with their people granted responsible government.As a result, it sought to insist on the incorporation of the princely states into India in its negotiations with Mountbatten, but the British took the view that this was not in their power to grant.
A few British leaders, particularly Lord Mounbatten the last british viceroy of India, were also uncomfortable with breaking links between independent India and the princely states. The development of trade, commerce and communications during the 19th and 20th centuries had bound the princely states to British India through a complex network of interests. Agreements relating to railways, customs, irrigation, the use of ports, and other similar agreements would disappear, posing a serious threat to the economic life of the subcontinent. Mountbatten was also persuaded by the argument of Indian leaders such as V. P. Menon that the integration of the princely states into independent India would to some extent assuage the wounds of partition based on religion. The result was that Mountbatten personally favoured and worked towards the accession of princely states to India following the transfer of power, as proposed by the Congress
The rulers of the princely states were not uniformly enthusiastic about integrating their domains into independent India. Some, such as the kings of Bikaner and Jaipur, were motivated to join India out of ideological and patriotic considerations, but others insisted that they had the right to join either India or Pakistan, to remain independent, or form a union of their own.Bhopal Travancore & Hyderabad announced that they did not intend to join either dominion. Hyderabad went as far as to appoint trade representatives in European countries and commencing negotiations with the Portuguese to lease or buy Goa to give it access to the sea, and Travancore pointed to the strategic importance to western countries of its thorium reserves while asking for recognition. Some states proposed a subcontinent-wide confederation of princely states, as a third entity in addition to India and Pakistan. Bhopal attempted to build an alliance between the princely states and the Muslim League to counter the pressure being put on rulers by the Congress.
A number of factors contributed to the collapse of this initial resistance and to nearly all non-Muslim majority princely states agreeing to accede to India. An important factor was the lack of unity among the princes. The smaller states did not trust the larger states to protect their interests, and many Hindu rulers did not trust Muslim princes, in particular Hamidullah Khan & Nawab of Bhopal and a leading proponent of independence, whom they viewed as an agent for Pakistan.[ Others, believing integration to be inevitable, sought to build bridges with the Congress, hoping thereby to gain a say in shaping the final settlement. The resultant inability to present a united front or agree on a common position significantly reduced their bargaining power in negotiations with the Congress.
The decision by the Muslim League to stay out of the constituent assembly was also fatal to the princes’ plan to build an alliance with it to counter the Congress, and attempts to boycott the Constituent Assembly altogether failed on 28 April 1947, when the states of Baroda, , Bikaner, Cochin Gawalior, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala and Rewa took their seats in the Assembly.
Many princes were also pressured by popular sentiment favouring their states to be integrated with India, which meant their plans for independence had little support from their own subjects. In a few states, the chief ministers or Dewans played a significant role in convincing the princes to accede to India. The key factors that led the states to accept integration into India were, however, the efforts of Lord Mountbatten & Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Mountbatten played an important role in convincing reluctant monarchs to accede to the Indian Union. Mountbatten believed that securing the states’ accession to India was crucial to reaching a negotiated settlement with the Congress for the transfer of power. As a relative of the British King, he was trusted by most of the princes and was a personal friend of many, especially the Nawab of Bhopal, Hamidullah Khan. The princes also believed that he would be in a position to ensure the independent India adhered to any terms that might be agreed upon, because Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru and Patel had asked him to become the first Governor General of India.
Vallabhbhai Patel as Minister for Home and States Affairs was entrusted the responsibility of welding the British Indian, provinces and the princely states into a united India. By far the most significant factor that led to the princes’ decision to accede to India was the policy of the Congress and, in particular, of Patel and Menon. The Congress’ stated position was that the princely states were not sovereign entities, and as such could not opt to be independent notwithstanding the end of paramountcy. The princely states, it declared, must therefore accede to either India or Pakistan.
Patel and Menon, who were charged with the actual job of negotiating with the princes, took a very conciliatory approach than Nehru. The official policy statement of the Government of India made by Patel on 5 July 1947 made no threats. Instead, it emphasized the unity of India and the common interests of the princes and independent India, reassured them about the Congress’ intentions, and invited them to join independent India “to make laws sitting together as friends than to make treaties as aliens He reiterated that the States Department would not attempt to establish a relationship of domination over the princely states. Unlike the Political Department of the British Government, it would not be an instrument of paramountcy, but a medium whereby business could be conducted between the states and India as equals.
Instruments of Accession
Patel and Menon backed up their diplomatic efforts by producing treaties that were designed to be attractive to rulers of princely states. Two key documents were produced. The first was the Standstill Agreement, which confirmed that the agreements and administrative practices that existed as between the princely state in question and the British would be continued by India. The second was the instrument of accession, by which the ruler of the princely state in question agreed to the accession of his kingdom to independent India, and to granting India control over specified subject matters. The nature of the subject matters varied depending on the acceding state. The states which had internal autonomy under the British signed an Instrument of Accession which only ceded three subjects to the government of India—defence, external affairs and communications, each defined in accordance with List 1 to Schedule VII of the Government of India Act 1935. Rulers of states which were in effect estates or talukas, where substantial administrative powers were exercised by the Crown, signed a different Instrument of Accession, which vested all residuary and jurisdiction in the government of India. Rulers of states which had an intermediate status signed a third type of Instrument, which preserved the degree of power they had under the British.
The limited scope of the Instruments of Accession and the promise of a wide-ranging autonomy and the other guarantees they offered, gave sufficient comfort to many rulers, who saw this as the best deal they could strike given the lack of support from the British, and popular internal pressures. Between May 1947 and the transfer of power on 15 August 1947, the vast majority of states signed Instruments of Accession. A few, however, held out. Some simply delayed signing the Instrument of Accession. Piploda, a small state in central India, did not accede until March 1948. The biggest problems, however, arose with a few border states, such as Jodhpur, which tried to negotiate better deals with Pakistan, with Junagarh , which actually tried to accede to Pakistan, and yderabad and Kashmir, which intended to remain independent.
Border states
The ruler of Jodhpur, Hanwant Singh, was antipathetic to the Congress, and did not see much future in India for him or the lifestyle he wished to lead. Along with the ruler of Jaisalmer, he entered into negotiations with Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was the designated head of state for Pakistan. Jinnah was keen to attract some of the larger border states, hoping thereby to attract other Rajput states to Pakistan and compensate for the loss of half of Bengal and Punjab. He offered to permit Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to accede to Pakistan on any terms they chose, giving their rulers blank sheets of paper and asking them to write down their terms, which he would sign.[ Jaisalmer refused, arguing that it would be difficult for him to side with Muslims against Hindus in the event of communal problems. Hanwant Singh came close to signing. However, the atmosphere in Jodhpur was in general hostile to accession to Pakistan. Mountbatten also pointed out that the accession of a predominantly Hindu state to Pakistan would violate the principle of the two nations theory on which Partition was based, and was likely to cause communal violence in the State. Hanwant Singh was persuaded by these arguments, and somewhat reluctantly agreed to accede to India.
Junagadh
Although the states were in theory free to choose whether they wished to accede to India or Pakistan, Mountbatten had pointed out that “geographic compulsions” meant that most of them must choose India. In effect, he took the position that only the states that shared a border with Pakistan could choose to accede to it.
The Nawab of Junagarh, a princely state located on the south-western end of Gujrat and having no common border with Pakistan, chose to accede to Pakistan ignoring Mountbatten’s views, arguing that it could be reached from Pakistan by sea. The rulers of two states that were subject to the suzerainty of Junagadh mangrol and Babriawad—reacted to this by declaring their independence from Junagadh and acceding to India. In response, the Nawab of Junagadh militarily occupied the states. The rulers of neighbouring states reacted angrily, sending their troops to the Junagadh frontier and appealed to the Government of India for assistance. A group of Junagadhi people, led by Samal dass gandhi, formed a government-in-exile.
India believed that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, the communal tension already simmering in Gujarat would worsen, and refused to accept the accession. The government pointed out that the state was 80% Hindu, and called for a plebiscite to decide the question of accession. Simultaneously, they cut off supplies of fuel and coal to Junagadh, severed air and postal links, sent troops to the frontier, and reoccupied the principalities of Mangrol and Babariawad that had acceded to India. Pakistan agreed to discuss a plebiscite, subject to the withdrawal of Indian troops, a condition India rejected. On 26 October, the Nawab and his family fled to Pakistan following clashes with Indian troops. On 7 November, Junagadh’s court, facing collapse, invited the Government of India to take over the State’s administration. The Government of India agreed. A plebiscite was conducted in February 1948, which went almost unanimously in favour of accession to India.
Kashmir
At the time of the transfer of power, Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu, although the state itself had a Muslim majority. Hari Singh was equally hesitant about acceding to either India or Pakistan, as either would have provoked adverse reactions in parts of his kingdom. He signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan and proposed one with India as well, but announced that Kashmir intended to remain independent. However, his rule was opposed by Sheikh Abdullah.
Pakistan, attempting to force the issue of Kashmir’s accession, cut off supplies and transport links. The chaos in Punjab resulting from Partition had also severed transport links with India, meaning that Kashmir’s only links with the two dominions was by air.. Pathan tribesmen of Pakistan crossed the border and attacked Kashmir The invaders made rapid progress towards Srinagar and were involved in large scale cold blooded massacre of hindu population. RSS volunteers some how provided initial resistance to the invasion by these tribesmen . The Maharaja of Kashmir wrote to India, asking for military assistance. India required the signing of an instrument of accession The Maharaja complied, but Nehru declared that it would have to be confirmed by a plebiscite, although there was no legal requirement to seek such confirmation.
Indian troops secured Jammu & Srinagar and the valley itself during the first kashmir war, but the intense fighting flagged with the onset of winter, which made much of the state impassable. Ignoring advice of General Thimmaya, who was heading Indian Armed forces, the then prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, declared a ceasefire and sought UN arbitration, arguing that India would otherwise have to invade Pakistan itself, in view of its failure to stop the tribal incursions. The plebiscite was never held, and on 26 January 1950, the Constitution of India came into force in Kashmir, but with special provisions made for the state. India did not, however, secure administrative control over all of Kashmir. The northern and western portions of Kashmir came under Pakistan’s control in 1947. In the 1962, China occupied Aksai Chin, the north-eastern region bordering Ladhakh, which it continues to control and administer.
Hyderabad
http://ancientindia.co.in/hyderabad-accession-india/
Sukait & Mandi Kingdoms
http://ancientindia.co.in/sukait-mandi-kingdoms/
The Instruments of Accession were limited, transferring control of only three matters to India, and would by themselves have produced a rather loose federation, with significant differences in administration and governance across the various states. Full political integration, in contrast, would require a process whereby the political actors in the various states were “persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center”, namely, the republic of India This was not an easy task. While some princely states such as Mysore had legislative systems of governance that were based on a broad franchise and not significantly different from those of British India, in others, political decision-making took place in small, limited aristocratic circles and governance was, as a result, at best paternalistic and at worst the result of courtly intrigue.[ Having secured the accession of the princely states, the Government of India between 1948 and 1950 turned to the task of welding the states and the former British provinces into one polity under a single republican constitution
Fast-track integration
The first step in this process, carried out between 1947 and 1949, was to merge the smaller states that were not seen by the Government of India to be viable administrative units either into neighbouring provinces, or with other princely states to create a “princely union” This policy was contentious, since it involved the dissolution of the very states whose existence India had only recently guaranteed in the Instruments of Accession. Patel and Menon emphasised that without integration, the economies of states would collapse, and anarchy would arise if the princes were unable to provide democracy and govern properly. They pointed out that many of the smaller states were very small and lacked resources to sustain their economies and support their growing populations. Many also imposed tax rules and other restrictions that impeded free trade, and which had to be dismantled in a united India.
Given that merger involved the breach of guarantees personally given by Mountbatten, initially Patel and Nehru intended to wait until after his term as Governor General ended. An Adivasi uprising in Orissa in late 1947, however, forced their hand. In December 1947, princes from the Eastern India Agency and Chhattisgarh Agency were summoned to an all-night meeting with Menon, where they were persuaded to sign Merger Agreements integrating their states into Orissa, the central provinces and Bihaar with effect from 1 January 1948.[ Later that year, 66 states in Gujarat and the Deccan were merged into Bombay, including the large states of Kolhapur and Baroda Other small states were merged into were Madras East Punjab West Bengal, Assam and united provinces Not all states that signed Merger Agreements were integrated into provinces, however. Thirty states of the former Punjab hill states agency which lay near the international border and had signed Merger Agreements were integrated into Himachal Pradesh, a distinct entity which was administered directly by the centre as a chief commissioners province. for reasons of security.
The Merger Agreements required rulers to cede “full and exclusive jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to governance” of their state to India In return for their agreement to entirely cede their states, it gave princes a large number of guarantees. Princes would receive an annual payment from the Indian government in the form of a privy purse as compensation for the surrender of their powers and the dissolution of their states. While state property would be taken over, their private property would be protected, as would all personal privileges, dignities and titles. Succession was also guaranteed according to custom. In addition, the provincial administration was obliged to take on the staff of the princely states with guarantees of equal pay and treatment
Although the Merger Agreements were principally intended for smaller, non-viable states, they were also applied to a few larger states.Kutch in western India, and Tripura and Manipur in North East India all of which lay along international borders, were also asked to sign Merger Agreements, despite being larger states, following which they became Chief Commissioners’ Provinces. Bhopal, whose ruler was proud of the efficiency of his administration and feared that it would lose its identity if merged with the Maratha states that were its neighbours, also became a directly administered Chief Commissioner’s Province, as didBilaspur, much of which was likely to be flooded on completion of the Bhakra dam.
Through this process, Patel obtained the unification of 222 states in the Kathiawar peninsula of his native Gujarat into the princely union of Saurashtra in January 1948, with six more states joining the union the following year. Madhya Bharat emerged on 28 May 1948 from a union of Gwalior, Indore & eighteen small states. In Punjab, Patiala the Patiala & East Punjab states Union (PEPSU) was formed on 15 July 1948 from Patiala, Kapurthala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Malerkotla, Nalargarh, & Kalsia
Centralisation and constitutionalisation
Democratisation still left open one important distinction between the former princely states and the former British provinces, namely, that since the princely states had signed limited Instruments of Accession covering only three subjects, they were insulated from government policies in other areas. The Congress viewed this as hampering its ability to frame policies that brought about social justice and national developmen Consequently, they sought to secure to the central government the same degree of powers over the former princely states as it had over the former British provinces. In May 1948, at the initiative of V. P. Menon, a meeting was held in Delhi between the Rajpramukhs of the princely unions and the States Department, at the end of which the Rajpramukhs signed new Instruments of Accession which gave the Government of India the power to pass laws in respect of all matters that fell within the seventh schedule of the GOI Act 1935 Subsequently, each of the princely unions, as well as Mysore and Hyderabad, agreed to adopt the Constitution of India as the constitution of that state, thus ensuring that they were placed in exactly the same legal position vis-à-vis the central government as the former British provinces. The only exception was Kashmir, whose relationship with India continued to be governed by the original Instrument of Accession, and the constitution produced by the states constituent assembly.
The Constitution of India classified the constituent units of India into three classes—Part A, B, and C states. The former British provinces, together with the princely states that had been merged into them, were the Part A states. The princely unions, plus Mysore and Hyderabad, were the Part B states. The former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces and other centrally administered areas, except Andaman & Nikobar Islands, were the Part C states. The only practical difference between the Part A states and the Part B states was that the constitutional heads of the Part B states were the Rajpramukhs appointed under the terms of the Covenants of Merger, rather than Governors appointed by the central government. In addition, Constitution gave the central government a significant range of powers over the former princely states, providing amongst other things that “their governance shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by, the President”. Apart from that, the form of government in both was identical.
Reorganisation
The distinction between Part A and Part B states was only intended to last for a brief, transitional period. In 1956, the States Reorganization Act, reorganized the former British provinces and princely states on the basis of language. Simultaneously, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution removed the distinction between Part A and Part B states, both of which were now treated only as “states”, with Part C states being renamed Union Territorries”. The Rajpramukhs lost their authority, and were replaced as the constitutional heads of state by Governors, who were appointed by the central government. These changes finally brought the princely order to an end. In both legal and practical terms, the territories that formerly were part of the princely states were now fully integrated into India and did not differ in any way from those that were formerly part of British India The personal privileges of the princes—the privy purse, the exemption from customs duty, and customary dignities—survived, only to be abolished in 1971
Colonial enclaves
The French enclaves in 1947
The integration of the princely states raised the question of the future of the remaining colonial enclaves in India. At independence, the regions of Pondicharry, Karikal, Yanam, Mahe & Chandernagore were still colonies of France, andDaman & Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Goa remained colonies of Portugal. An agreement between France and India in 1948 provided for an election in France’s remaining Indian possessions to choose their political future. A plebiscite held in Chandernagore on 19 June 1949 resulted in a vote of 7,463 to 114 in favour of being integrated with India. It was ceded to India on a de facto basis on 14 August 1949 and dejure on 2 May 1950 In the other enclaves, however, the pro-French camp, led by Edouard Goubert, used the administrative machinery to suppress the pro-merger groups. Popular discontent rose, and in 1954 demonstrations by resulted in pro-merger groups assuming power. A referendum in Pondichary and Karaikal in October 1954 resulted in a vote in favour of merger, and on 1 November 1954, de facto control over all four enclaves was transferred to the Republic of India. A treaty of cession was signed in May 1956, and following ratification by the French National Assembly in May 1962, de jure control of the enclaves was also transferred.
Demonstrators demanding the integration of Goa into India march against the Portuguese on 15 August 1955. Portugal, in contrast, resisted diplomatic solutions. It viewed its continued possession of its Indian enclaves as a matter of national pride and, in 1951, it amended its constitution to convert its possessions in India into Portuguese provinces. In July 1954, an uprising in Dadra and Nagar Haveli threw off Portuguese rule. The Portuguese attempted to send forces from Daman to reoccupy the enclaves, but were prevented from doing so by Indian troops. Portugal initiated proceedings before the international court of justice to compel India to allow its troops access to the enclave, but the Court rejected its complaint in 1960, holding that India was within its rights in denying Portugal military access. In 1961, the Constitution of India was amended to incorporate Dadra and Nagar Haveli into India as a Union Territory.
Goa, Daman and Diu remained an outstanding issue. On 15 August 1955, five thousand non-violent demonstrators marched against the Portuguese at the border, and were met with gunfire, killing 22. In December 1960, the UN General assembly rejected Portugal’s contention that its overseas possessions were provinces, and formally listed them as “non-self-governing territories” Although Nehru continued to favour a negotiated solution, the Portuguese suppression of a revolt in Angola in 1961 radicalised Indian public opinion, and increased the pressure on the Government of India to take military action. African leaders, too, put pressure on Nehru to take action in Goa, which they argued would save Africa from further horrors. On 18 December 1961, following the collapse of an American attempt to find a negotiated solution, the Indian Army entered Portuguese India and defeated the Portuguese garrisons there. The Portuguese took the matter to the security council but a resolution calling on India to withdraw its troops immediately was defeated by the USSR veto Portugal surrendered on 19 December. 1961 This take-over ended the last of the European colonies in India. Goa was incorporated into India as a centrally administered union territory and, in 1987, became a state.
Sikkim
The former princely state of Sikkim, located at a strategically important point on the border between India and China, was integrated into India in 1975 as its 22nd state.
Three princely states bordering India—Nepal Bhutan and Sikkim—were not integrated into the Republic of India in the period between 1947 and 1950. Nepal had been recognised by the British and the Government of India as being de jure independent. Bhutan had in the British period been considered a protectorate outside the international frontier of India. The Government of India entered into a treaty with Bhutan in 1949 continuing this arrangement, and providing that Bhutan would abide by the advice of the Government of India in the conduct of its external affairs.
Historically, Sikkim was a British dependency, with a status similar to that of the other princely states, and was therefore considered to be within the frontiers of India in the colonial period. On independence, however, the Chogyl of Sikkim resisted full integration into India. Given the region’s strategic importance to India, the Government of India signed first a Standstill Agreement and then in 1950 a full treaty with the Chogyal of Sikkim which in effect made it a protectorate which was no longer part of India. India had responsibility for defence, external affairs and communications, and ultimate responsibility for law and order, but Sikkim was otherwise given full internal autonomy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chogyal Palden Thondup, Namgyal, supported by the minority Bhutia and Lepcha upper classes, attempted to negotiate greater powers, particularly over external affairs, to give Sikkim more of an international personality. These policies were opposed byKazi Lhendup Dorji and Sikkim congress, who represented the ethnic nepali middle classes and took a more pro-Indian view.
In April 1973, an anti-Chogyal agitation broke out; the agitators demanded the conduct of popular elections. The Sikkim police were unable to control the demonstrations, and Dorji asked India to exercise its responsibility for law and order and intervene. India facilitated negotiations between the Chogyal and Dorji, and produced an agreement which envisaged the reduction of the Chogyal to the role of a constitutional monarch and the holding of elections based on a new ethnic power-sharing formula. The Chogyal’s opponents won an overwhelming victory, and a new Constitution was drafted providing for Sikkim to be associated with the Republic of India. On 10 April 1975, the Sikkim Assembly passed a resolution calling for the state to be fully integrated into India. This resolution was endorsed by 97% of the vote in a referendum held on 14 April 1975, following which the Indian Government amended the constitution to admit Sikkim into India as its 22nd state.
Secessionism and sub-nationalism
While the majority of princely states absorbed into India have been fully integrated, a few outstanding issues remain. The most prominent of these is in relation to Kashmir, where a violent secessionist insurgency has been raging since the late 1980s.
Some academics suggest that the insurgency in Kashmir is at least partly a result of the manner in which it was integrated into India. Kashmir, uniquely amongst princely states, was not required to sign either a Merger Agreement or a revised Instrument of Accession giving India control over a larger number of issues than the three originally provided for. Instead, the power to make laws relating to Kashmir was granted to the Government of India by Article 5 of the constitution of J & K and was, under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, somewhat more restricted than in relation to other states. Widmalm argues that during the 1980s, a number of Kashmiri youth began to feel that the Indian government was increasingly interfering in the state politics The elections of 1987 caused them to lose faith in the political process and begin the violent insurgency which is still ongoing.
Separatist movements also exist in two other former princely states located in Northeast India—Tripura and Manipur. These separatist movements are generally treated by scholars as being part of the broader problem of insurgency of NE India, rather being a result of specific problems in integrating the princely states into India, as the Kashmir problem is and, in particular, to reflect the failure of the Government of India to adequately address the aspirations of tribal groups in the Northeast, or to tackle the tensions arising from the immigration of people from other parts of India to the north-eastern areas.
The integration of former princely states with other provinces to form new states has also given rise to some issues. The Telangana region region, comprising Telgu speaking districts of the former Hyderabad State, were in many ways different from the Telugu-speaking areas of British India with which they were merged. In recognition of these differences, the states reorganization commission originally recommended that Telengana be created as a separate state, rather than as part of a broader Telugu-speaking entity. This recommendation was rejected by the Government of India, and Telengana was merged into Andhra Pradesh. The result was the emergence in the 1960s of a movement demanding a separate Telengana state.The demand has been accepted by the Union Government, leading to formation of Telangana as the 29th state of India in June 2014. A similar movement, although less strong, exists in the Vidharba region of Maharashtra, which consists of the former Nagpu and Berar region of the former Hyderabad state.
The integration process repeatedly brought Indian and Pakistani leaders into conflict. During negotiations, Jinnah, representing the Muslim League, strongly supported the right of the princely states to remain independent, joining neither India nor Pakistan, an attitude which was diametrically opposed to the stance taken by Nehru and the Congress and which was reflected in Pakistan’s support of Hyderabad’s bid to stay independent. Post-partition, Pakistan accused India of hypocrisy on the ground that there was little difference between the accession of the ruler of Junagadh to Pakistan—which India refused to recognise—and the accession of the Maharajah of Kashmir to India, and for several years refused to recognise the legality of India’s incorporation of Junagadh, treating it as de jure Pakistani territory
Modern historians have also re-examined the role of the States Department and Lord Mountbatten during the accession process. Ian Copland argues that the Congress leaders did not intend the settlement contained in the Instruments of Accession to be permanent even when they were signed, and at all times privately contemplated a complete integration of the sort that ensued between 1948 and 1950. He points out that the mergers and cessation of powers to the Government of India between 1948 and 1950 contravened the terms of the Instruments of Accession, and were incompatible with the express assurances of internal autonomy and preservation of the princely states which Mountbatten had given the princes Menon in his memoirs stated that the changes to the initial terms of accession were in every instance freely consented to by the princes with no element of coercion. Copland disagrees, on the basis that foreign diplomats at the time believed that the princes had been given no choice but to sign, and that a few princes expressed their unhappiness with the arrangements. He also criticises Mountbatten’s role, saying that while he stayed within the letter of the law, he was at least under a moral obligation to do something for the princes when it became apparent that the Government of India was going to alter the terms on which accession took place, and that he should never have lent his support to the bargain given that it could not be guaranteed after independence Both Copland and Ramusack argue that, in the ultimate analysis, one of the reasons why the princes consented to the demise of their states was that they felt abandoned by the British, and saw themselves as having little other option. Older historians such as Lumby, in contrast, take the view that the princely states could not have survived as independent entities after the transfer of power, and that their demise was inevitable. They therefore view successful integration of all princely states into India as a triumph for the Government of India and Lord Mountbatten, and as a tribute to the sagacity of the majority of princes, who jointly achieved in a few months what the empire had attempted, unsuccessfully, to do for over a century— ie to unite all of India under one rule